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EVEN SILENCE HAS NO PRAYER: THE THIRD CIRCUIT SACKS
COACH'S SILENT TEAM PRAYER IN BORDEN v. SCHOOL
DISTRICT OF EAST BRUNSWICK
I. INTRODUCTION
Hemingway High School football coach Bucky Davis prays with his
team before and after every game.' Wilson High School coach Darryl
Page participates in a similar tradition with his team before each gridiron
battle.2 Apparently, none of the players or parents at these South Caro-
lina public high schools take issue with their coaches' involvement in team
prayer.3 Perhaps Marcus Borden, head football coach at East Brunswick
High School in New Jersey, should consider taking a coaching position in
1. See Shawn Singleton, Football Teams Walk Fine Line of Religion in Schools,
SCNow.coM, Aug. 23, 2008, http://www.scnow.com/scp/sports/high-school_
prep/high school football/article/football-teams.walk-fine line of religionin
_schools/13240/ ("We end every practice with the Lord's prayer.... Before and
after every game, we do the Lord's prayer, and we try to do a devotion every
week."). The Hemingway coaching staff also takes its players to a three-day Fellow-
ship of Christian Athletes (FCA) football camp during the summer to work on
football skills and learn aboutJesus Christ. See id. (describing school's involvement
with FCA summer camp in summer 2008).
2. See id. (recounting Coach Page's prayer policy with his football team). In
fact, Grant Teaff, director of the American Football Coaches Association, estimates
that more than half of high school football coaches pray with their teams. See Stan
Grossfeld, An Issue of Fair Pray: Disagreement Sends Coach, School to Court, BosTON
GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2006, at D1 ("This is an unscientific estimate, but I'd say well over
50 percent of the coaches have prayers before a game.... To take that knee is such
a feeling of unity.").
3. See Singleton, supra note 1 (describing continued policy of team prayer
before sporting events at various South Carolina public schools). Hemingway
High School is a public school located in Hemingway, South Carolina. See Hem-
ingway High - Home, http://www.wcsd.kl2.sc.us/education/school/school.php?
sectionid=9 (last visitedJan. 2, 2010) (displaying basic information about Heming-
way High School). Wilson High School is a public high school of 1,389 students
located in Florence, South Carolina. See Florence Public School District One
Home Page, http://www.fsdl.org/Schools/wilson/wilson.htm (last visited Jan. 2,
2010) (displaying Wilson High School information).
One law professor has suggested that this involvement with prayer "raise[s]
obvious First Amendment problems" and that the relevant districts' legal counsel
should advise the coaches immediately that "adherence to the Constitution's inter-
preted obligations extends beyond the cessation of the pre-game stadium prayer."
See First Amendment Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/first
amendment/2008/08/football-game-p.html (Aug. 30, 2008) (discussing prayer
policies of South Carolina high school football coaches and potential Establish-
ment Clause implications). Without any complaints from opponents, however,
these practices will most likely continue. See Bill Finley, Church and Team: Where to
Draw the Line?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at 14LI ("Rules governing prayer and
public high school sports teams remain open to interpretation. Often, the issue
does not come up unless parents object to team prayers or the involvement of a
coach.").
(801)
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South Carolina. 4 Coach Borden led, participated in, and organized team
prayers at East Brunswick for twenty-three seasons.5 In a recent controver-
sial case, however, the Third Circuit restricted him from continuing this
tradition of organized team prayer. 6 In addition, the court informed Bor-
den that he was not permitted to even silently bow his head or take a knee
while his team engaged in player-led prayers.
7
4. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 2008)
(explaining Borden's affiliation with East Brunswick High School and tradition of
praying with team), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (2009).
5. See id. at 158-62 (recounting Borden's twenty-three year involvement with
team prayers).
6. See id. at 176 (finding that Borden's involvement with prayer violated Estab-
lishment Clause). For opposing stances on the Third Circuit's opinion, compare
Tina Kelley, Coach in NewJersey Cannot Pray With Players, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008,
at D3 (reporting that Reverend Barry Lynn, executive director of Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, stated that "[t] he coach went way over
the line in pushing prayer on players, the school blew the whistle, and now the
court has, I hope, ended this game"), Press Release, Anti-Defamation League, ADL
Welcomes Ruling that NewJersey Football Coach May Not Lead Students in Prayer
(Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.adl.org/PresRele/RelChStSep_90/5271_90.htm
("Common sense and the constitution dictate that they [public school teachers
and coaches] may not use that authority, given to them by the government, to
create an environment where children of differing faiths, or of no faith, are made
to feel unwelcome on [sic] their school."), Press Release, Interfaith Alliance, Inter-
faith Alliance Applauds School Prayer Decision (Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.inter
faithalliance.org/news/45-interfaith-alliance-applauds-school-prayer-decision
(quoting Interfaith Alliance president, Rev. Dr. C. Welton Gaddy's statement that,
"I applaud the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for affirming our view that Mr. Bor-
den's actions violated students' religious freedom when he led them in prayer. It
is not the role of public schools to indoctrinate our children with one faith's relig-
ious values."), and Posting of Richard B. Katskee to ACSBlog, http://www.acsblog.
org/religion-clauses-on-pigskin-and-prayer-at-public-school.html (Apr. 18, 2008,
13:45 EST) ("The Third Circuit's decision in Borden v. School District of the Township
of East Brunswick is a victory not just for the East Brunswick School District, but for
its students-and for religious freedom."), with Press Release, Alliance Defense
Fund, U.S. Supreme Court Should Hear NJ Coach's Prayer Case (Nov. 20, 2008),
http://www.alliancealert.org/2008/11 /20/adf-us-supreme-court-should-hear-nj-
coach%E2%80%99s-prayer-case/ (quoting ADF Chief Counsel Benjamin Bull as
saying, "[w]e're in big trouble in this country if a high school football coach can't
even show respect during the prayer of his players. The Constitution does not
prohibit him from bowing his head or kneeling during student-led prayer."), Rob
Boston, Offside, Out of Bounds and Unconstitutional, http://www.au.org/media/
church-and-state/archives/2008/06/offside-out-of.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2010)
(reporting that another New Jersey football coach stated, "I feel like it's a blow to
me .... [Team prayer] is an important part of what we do every day [sic] we go
out on the field, including summer. We always take a second before practice."),
and Christian Coalition of America, Tyrannical Third Circuit Court of Appeals on
Wednesday Ruled That a Football Coach May Not Silently Bow His Head or 'Take
a knee' with His Team During Student-led Prayers Prior to a Football Game (Apr.
18 2008), http://www.cc.org/newsletter/april_18_2008 ("[T]he liberal Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals tyrannically overruled a lower courtjudge's decision that the
coach had First Amendment rights to pray with the team.").
7. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 178 (finding that Borden's proposed actions of bow-
ing head and taking knee while his team prays also violates Establishment Clause).
[Vol. 54: p. 801
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Prayer in public school is a divisive issue that has led to multiple court
cases and vigorous public debate.8 In 1962, the Supreme Court held that
school-sponsored prayer is prohibited in public schools under the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment.9 The Court further extended
this prohibition to disallow Bible reading in schools, conducting prayers at
graduation ceremonies, and reciting student-initiated and student-led
prayers over loud speakers at high school football games. 10 In Borden v.
School District of East Brunswick,l ' the Third Circuit added an additional
prohibition of prayer in a public school setting. 12 In a narrow opinion,
the Third Circuit held that a coach silently bowing his head and taking a
knee while his team engages in student-initiated and student-led prayers is
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's endorsement test.' 3
This Casebrief indentifies the Third Circuit's preferred application of
the endorsement test to alleged Establishment Clause violations and high-
lights the emphasis the court places on historical context in reaching its
conclusions.' 4 Part II discusses the Establishment Clause's prohibition of
school-sponsored prayer and describes the three tests the Supreme Court
uses in Establishment Clause cases, focusing on the endorsement test.1 5
Part III discusses the Third Circuit's opinion in Borden.16 Part IV analyzes
the Third Circuit's preferred application of the endorsement test, high-
lighting the importance the court places on the history surrounding a
8. See Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing Concep-
tions and Historic Changes, 13 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503, 526 (2006) ("Prayer
and other religious observances at government functions, and government displays
of religious symbols, have given rise to an intense and peculiarly American set of
controversies."). For examples of differing views on prayer in public schools, see
supra note 6 and accompanying text. For examples of Supreme Court cases dis-
cussing prayer in public schools, see infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
9. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) ("[B]y using its public school
system to encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York has
adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.").
10. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding
that mandatory reading from Bible at start of school day violates Establishment
Clause); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prohibiting
student-led prayers over loud speaker of high school football games); Lee v. Weis-
man, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (finding rabbi's prayer at graduation ceremony imper-
missible under Establishment Clause).
11. 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (2009).
12. See id. (prohibiting coach from bowing head and taking knee while his
team prays).
13. See id. at 179 (stating holding of case).
14. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's decision in Borden, see infra notes
116-56 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the prohibition on prayer in public schools and the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause tests, see infra notes 20-67 and accompany-
ing text.
16. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion in Borden, see infta notes
75-115 and accompanying text.
2009]
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challenged practice.' 7 This section also offers advice to practitioners han-
dling similar cases in the Third Circuit.18 Finally, Part V concludes that
such Establishment Clause cases face a difficult challenge under the scru-
tiny of the endorsement test in the Third Circuit.19
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOL, AND THE
ENDORSEMENT TEST
A. The Establishment Clause Prohibits School-Sponsored Prayer in
the Classroom
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
20
Though many courts agree that "modern Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence is rife with confusion," the Supreme Court has consistently held
that the Clause prohibits school-sponsored prayer in public schools.2 1 In
17. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's preferred application of the endorse-
ment test, see infra notes 116-49 and accompanying text.
18. For suggestions to Third Circuit practitioners, see infra notes 150-56 and
accompanying text.
19. For a concluding discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the en-
dorsement test, see infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1995);
see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that "the incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the
Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of consistent application. All
told, this Court's jurisprudence leaves courts, governments, and believers and
nonbelievers alike confused-an observation that is hardly new"); JOHN WITTE, JR.,
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, at xx (2005) ("Indeed,
the [Supreme] Court's recent record on religious rights and liberties has become
vilified for its lack of consistent and coherent principles, its uncritical use of
mechanical tests and misleading metaphors, and its massive farrago of divided
opinions."); Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses,
8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) (arguing that "the Supreme Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence is a mess-both hopelessly confused and deeply contra-
dictory. On a purely doctrinal level, the Court cannot even settle on one standard
to apply in all Establishment Clause cases.... Many of the Justices have endorsed
several different-and often conflicting-constitutional standards.").
Several commentators have noted that despite the confusing standards, the
Supreme Court has consistently prohibited school-sponsored prayer in public
schools. See, e.g., BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: How
ENGEL V. VTALE CHANGED AMERICA 213 (2007) ("For more than forty years, neither
the U.S. Supreme Court nor Congress has ever sanctioned government-sponsored
prayer at public schools."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should be Sepa-
rate, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2193, 2208 (2008) ("[T]he Supreme Court has re-
peated for forty-five years that prayer, even voluntary prayer, does not belong in
public schools."); Robert M. O'Neil, Who Says You Can't Pray?, 3 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y &
L. 347, 348 (1996) ("The Supreme Court has never wavered from its conviction,
expressed in 1962 and reaffirmed the following year, that devotional use of scrip-
ture and recital of prayer in public schools violates the First Amendment's Estab-
lishment Clause.").
804 [Vol. 54: p. 801
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the landmark 1962 case Engel v. gitale,22 the Court held that reading a
non-denominational prayer at the beginning of each school day violated
the Establishment Clause. 23 Just one year later, the Court struck down a
Pennsylvania law that required the reading of ten Bible verses at the begin-
ning of each school day.2 4 The Court "stretched its separationist logic to
its furthest point" in Wallace v. Jaffree,2 5 where it found that an Alabama
statute authorizing a moment of silence "for meditation or silent prayer"
was constitutionally impermissible. 26 These interpretations of the Estab-
lishment Clause stressed the Court's belief that "a union of government
and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." 27
B. The Path to the Third Circuit's Adoption of the Endorsement Test
Over the years, the Supreme Court has created three tests for analyz-
ing Establishment Clause claims. 28 Specifically, the endorsement test was
created by Justice O'Connor in an effort to curb government embrace-
22. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
23. See id. at 424 (finding that state policy of praying in public schools violates
Establishment Clause). The contested, non-denominational prayer was: "Almighty
God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon
us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
24. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963)
(summarizing holding of case). The Court also struck down the city of Baltimore's
law requiring reading from the Bible and/or recitation of the Lord's Prayer to
start each school day. See id. at 211-12 (discussing contested rule adopted by Board
of School Commissioners of Baltimore City in 1905). Schempp had far-reaching
effects, as thirty-nine states allowed or required reading from the Bible in the class-
room. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 21, at 163 (providing background to Schempp).
25. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
26. See Wrrrr, supra note 21, at 207-08 (discussing Wallace); see also Wallace,
472 U.S. at 40 (describing contested Alabama statute).
27. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 54 n.39 (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 431); see also
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221 (stating that "it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite" (quoting
Engel, 370 U.S. at 425)). The Engel Court also warned of other problems that result
when government establishes a religion. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 ("When the
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to con-
form to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."). In addition, the
Court noted that "[t ]he history of governmentally established religion, both in
England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself
with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had
incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary
beliefs." Id. Finally, the Engel Court warned that "[a] nother purpose of the Estab-
lishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmen-
tally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." Id. at 432.
The Engel Court also recognized that "[t ] he history of man is inseparable from the
history of religion," and the Schempp Court acknowledged that "religion has been
closely identified with our history and government." Id. at 434; see also Schempp, 374
U.S. at 212 (discussing interaction of church and state).
28. For a discussion of the three tests the Supreme Court uses in Establish-
ment Clause cases, see infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
5
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ment of specific religions.2 9 The Third Circuit has subsequently followed
O'Connor's endorsement test in various Establishment Clause cases. 30
1. The Three Establishment Clause Tests
The Supreme Court has created three tests to determine whether al-
leged Establishment Clause violations create an unconstitutional union of
government and religion: the Lemon test, the coercion test, and the en-
dorsement test.3 1 The Court established the Lemon test in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,32 where it held that to be constitutional, a statute (1) "must have a
secular legislative purpose;" (2) "its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;" and (3) "the statute must
not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion."' 3 3 Although the
three-pronged Lemon test has received considerable criticism, it remains
good law, and the Third Circuit continues to apply it in Establishment
Clause cases.3 4
29. For a discussion of justice O'Connor's adoption of the endorsement test,
see infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's use of the endorsement test, see
infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
31. See Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 2004)("The Supreme Court has articulated three separate tests for determining whether
governmental action violates the Establishment Clause.").
32. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
33. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))
(establishing three-prong Lemon test). In Lemon, the Court addressed whether stat-
utes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that provided state aid to church-affiliated
schools were permissible under the Establishment Clause. See id. at 606 (discussing
issue). In a 5-3 opinion issued by ChiefJustice Warren Burger, the Court held that
both statutes were unconstitutional. See id. at 615 (invalidating both statutes).
34. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685-86 (2005) (noting criti-
cisms of Lemon and discussing Supreme Court's inconsistent application of Lemon
test); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing Lemon to "some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried"); Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247,
256 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that Lemon "has received much criticism"); ACLU OF
N.J. v. BLACK HORSE PIKE REG'L BD. OF EDUC., 84 F.3D 1471, 1484 (3D Cm. 1996)
(EN BANC) ("THE Lemon test has been the subject of critical debate in recent years,
and its continuing vitality has been called into question by members of the Su-
preme Court and by its noticeable absence from the analysis in some of the Court's
recent decisions.... Nevertheless, Lemon remains the law of the land. .. ."). For a
more in-depth discussion of Supreme Court Justices' objections to the Lemon test,
see Hugh Baxter, Managing Legal Change: The Transformation of Establishment Clause
Law, 46 UCLA L. REv. 343, 382-89 (1998) (elaborating on Court's dissatisfaction
with Lemon test).
For examples of the Third Circuit's use of the Lemon test to evaluate Establish-
ment Clause claims, see Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp.
Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 534 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that distribution of fliers pro-
moting Christian group at public school's back-to-school night does not offend
Lemon test); Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 411-13 (holding that Allegheny County's refusal
to remove plaque of Ten Commandments from public courthouse did not violate
Lemon test); Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1483-88 (concluding that school policy of
806 [Vol. 54: p. 801
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Secondly, the coercion test, created by Justice Kennedy in Lee v. Weis-
man,3 5 prohibits the government from "coerc[ing] anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise." 6 According to the Third Circuit,
the coercion test "focuses primarily on government action in public educa-
tion and examines whether school-sponsored religious activity has a coer-
cive effect on students." 37
Finally, the endorsement test examines whether "a reasonable ob-
server familiar with the history and context of [a challenged] display
would perceive the display as a government endorsement of religion."38
The endorsement test is generally invoked when the government has en-
gaged in expressive activities such as public prayer or the display of relig-
ious symbols. 39 Although recognized as a separate test, the endorsement
test has also been occasionally subsumed within the Lemon test.
40
2. Creation and Modification of the Endorsement Test
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor created the endorsement test in her
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.4 1 The Lynch Court held that,
under Lemon, a Rhode Island city did not violate the Establishment Clause
by including a creche in its annual Christmas display. 42 Justice O'Connor
allowing students to vote whether to pray at graduation ceremony is not permissi-
ble under Lemon test).
35. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
36. See id. at 587 (establishing coercion test). The Weisman Court found that a
school allowing a rabbi to pray at a graduation ceremony violated the Establish-
ment Clause. See id. at 586 (summarizing holding). The principal of a Rhode
Island middle school invited a rabbi to offer a prayer at a graduation ceremony,
and a graduating student's parent challenged the action. See id. at 581, 584 (re-
counting incidents giving rise to case). The Court found that "[t]he degree of
school involvement here made it clear that the graduation prayers bore the im-
print of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable
position." Id. at 590. The Court emphasized the potential "overt compulsion" felt
by students who have no desire to pray at their graduation. See id. at 593 (explain-
ing harmful effects of graduation prayers on students).
37. Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 400 (describing coercion test).
38. Id. at 401 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989)).
39. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (apply-
ing endorsement test to Santa Fe Independent School District's modified prayer
policy at football games); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (applying endorsement test to teaching of intelligent design in
public school).
40. See First Amendment Center, Religious Liberty in Public Life, http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/rel-liberty/establishment/index.aspx (last visited Jan.
2, 2010) (describing use of endorsement test); see also ACLU v. Black Horse Pike
Reg'I Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1485-86 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("This endorse-
ment test has at times been characterized as part and parcel of the Lemon test, and
at other times as separate and apart from it.") (footnotes omitted).
41. See465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also WrrE,
supra note 21, at 196 ("The endorsement approach is largely the creation ofJustice
O'Connor.").
42. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671-72 (providing overview of case and description
of holiday display). A creche is "a representation of the Nativity scene." See Mer-
20091
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agreed with the majority that there was no First Amendment violation, but
wrote separately "to suggest a clarification of [the Court's] Establishment
Clause doctrine."43 She determined an additional inquiry was necessary in
the context of government practices. 44 For O'Connor, the appropriate
question was whether the city endorsed Christianity by including the
cr&he in its holiday display. 45 The problem with governmental endorse-
ment, O'Connor argued, is that it "sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
bers of the political community."46 Justice O'Connor concluded that in
light of the city's total display, which included a Santa Claus house, rein-
deer, a Christmas tree, an elephant, a teddy bear, and a banner proclaim-
ing "SEASON'S GREETINGS," the creche could not "fairly be understood
to convey a message of government endorsement of religion." 4 7
After Lynch, a majority of the Court adopted the endorsement test in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 48 and Justice O'Connor continued to clarify
her test in subsequent cases. 49 In Allegheny, the Court addressed whether a
cr&he-displayed alone on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County
riam-webster.com, creche-Definition, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/creche (last visited Jan. 2, 2010). The challenged creche in Lynch contained
an InfantJesus, Mary andJoseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals. See Lynch,
465 U.S. at 671 (describing creche). Applying the Lemon test, the Court found that
the city had a secular purpose for the display, had not impermissibly advanced
religion, and had not created an excessive entanglement with religion. See id. at
685 (analyzing creche display under three-prong Lemon test).
43. See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining reason for concur-
rence and creating endorsement test).
44. See id. at 688 ("What is crucial is that a government practice not have the
effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion.").
45. See id. at 690 (stating central issue of case).
46. Id. at 688.
47. See id. at 693 (concluding that creche display did not violate endorsement
test). Specifically, Justice O'Connor found that the purpose of including the
creche was "celebration of [a] public holiday through its traditional symbols" and
that "no one contends that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an en-
dorsement of religion." Id. at 691-92. For further analysis of Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test, see generally Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and
Desirability, 18J.L. & POL. 499 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115 (1992).
48. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
49. See id. at 595 (holding thatJustice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch "pro-
vides a sound analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of religious
symbols"). For a discussion of the evolution of Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test, see Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary
Debates in Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious
Expression by the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 433, 513 (2000) ("The second ap-
proach that the Justices have used for evaluating religious expression by the state is
the endorsement test. Justice O'Connor was the first to articulate this approach in
her concurrence in Lynch, and she has elaborated upon this approach in a number
of later cases.").
[Vol. 54: p. 801
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Courthouse-and a menorah-displayed next to a Christmas tree and a
sign saluting liberty in front of the City-County Building-were permissi-
ble under the Establishment Clause.50 Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun asked "whether the display of the creche and the menorah, in
their respective 'particular physical settings,' has the effect of endorsing or
disapproving religious beliefs."5 1 The Court concluded that the creche-
situated alone on the "main" and "most beautiful" part of the court-
house-unconstitutionally endorsed Christianity, but that the menorah-
displayed as part of an "overall holiday setting"-did not endorse either
Christianity or Judaism.
52
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor clarified her endorsement
approach, stating that the test asks "whether a reasonable observer would view
[a challenged common religious practice] as a disapproval of his or her
particular religious choices."5 3 Six years later, in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette,54 Justice O'Connor wrote another concurring
opinion to stress that the endorsement test's reasonable observer "must be
deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in
which the religious display appears," and that the "knowledge attributed to
the reasonable observer [cannot] be limited to the information gleaned
simply from viewing the challenged display."55
50. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-602, 613-21 (addressing creche and menorah
displays). The creche was displayed alone with a banner reading "Glory to God in
the highest!" on the Grand Staircase-the "most public" and "most beautiful" part
of the Allegheny County Courthouse. See id. at 578-80 (describing creche display).
The Chanukah menorah was located outside the City-County Building alongside a
forty-five foot Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. See id. at 578-79 (summa-
rizing menorah display).
51. Id. at 597 (adopting endorsement test).
52. See id. at 599-602, 614, 620 (finding creche unconstitutional but finding
menorah constitutionally permissible). The key difference between the two dis-
plays was their contexts. See id. at 602, 620-21 (finding "the display of the creche in
this context... must be permanently enjoined" but in menorah's "particular context,
the menorah's display does not have an effect of endorsing religious faith") (em-
phasis added). The Court distinguished Allegheny's impermissible creche from the
permissible creche in Lynch, which was displayed next to a Santa Claus, reindeer, a
Christmas tree, and statues of carolers, among other holiday decorations. See id. at
596 (distinguishing Lynch).
53. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In addition, Jus-
tice O'Connor emphasized the effect that the "history and ubiquity" of a govern-
mental practice have on a reasonable observer in deciding whether a challenged
practice endorses religion. See id. at 630 ("IT]he 'history and ubiquity' of a prac-
tice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable ob-
server evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of
endorsement of religion.").
54. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
55. Id. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring). At issue in Pinette was "whether a
State violates the Establishment Clause when ... it permits a private party to dis-
play an unattended religious symbol in a traditional public forum located next to
its seat of government." Id. at 757 (plurality opinion). The Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Board ("Board") denied the Ku Klux Klan's application to place a
cross on Capitol Square, a "10-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding the statehouse
2009] CASEB1RIEF 809
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3. The Third Circuit Endorses Justice O'Connor's Test
The Third Circuit has adopted Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
for analyzing various Establishment Clause cases.56 In ACLU v. Black Horse
Pike Regional Board of Education,5 7 for example, the court applied the en-
dorsement test to determine the constitutionality of a school policy that
allowed high school seniors to vote for prayer at their graduation cere-
mony.58 The court emphasized the "totality of the circumstances" sur-
rounding the challenged policy, noting that the school had a
"longstanding tradition" of allowing local clergy to say prayers at gradua-
tion ceremonies. 59 The Third Circuit concluded that, in light of this his-
tory of prayer, the reasonable observer would view the school's policy as an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion.
60
Similarly, in Freethought Society v. Chester County61 and Modrovich v. Alle-
gheny County,62 the Third Circuit used the endorsement test to determine
whether Ten Commandments plaques on county courthouses violated the
in Columbus, Ohio" that was traditionally used for "public speeches, gatherings,
and festivals advocating and celebrating a variety of causes, both secular and relig-
ious." See id. at 757-58 (recounting facts of case). Justice Scalia, writing for a plu-
rality, held that the State may not interfere with religious expression "where it (1)
is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publi-
cally announced and open to all on equal terms." Id. at 770. Justice O'Connor
wrote separately to stress that the endorsement test "focuses upon the perception
of a reasonable, informed observer." Id. at 773 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (em-
phasizing proper application of endorsement test).
56. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 174
(3d Cir. 2002) (applying endorsement test to determine whether government al-
lowance of Jewish eruv display violates Establishment Clause); ACLU of NJ. v.
Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that 'Justice O'Connor's
opinion [in Allegheny] sets out the position that we must follow" in addressing con-
stitutionality of creche and menorah display in front of City Hall). For additional
discussion of Third Circuit cases applying the endorsement test, see infra notes 56-
67 and accompanying text.
57. 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
58. See id. at 1474 (presenting issue). The Third Circuit also used the Lemon
test to invalidate the challenged school policy. See id. at 1485-88 (applying three-
prong Lemon test).
59. See id. at 1474 (describing "longstanding tradition" of including prayer at
graduation ceremonies). The court also stressed the relevance of the "history and
ubiquity" of the practice. See id. at 1486 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Black Horse Pike Regional
Board of Education had a tradition of having local clergy members lead prayers at
its graduation ceremonies. See id. at 1474 (discussing factual background). Fear-
ing a potential Establishment Clause violation after the Supreme Court's ruling in
Weisman, the Board adopted a new policy allowing the seniors to vote if they
wanted a prayer at their graduation. See id. at 1474-75 (recounting implementation
of challenged policy).
60. See id. at 1487 (finding policy unconstitutional). The Third Circuit held
that the new policy "would certainly leave the reasonable non-adherent with the
impression that his or her religious choices were disfavored." Id.
61. 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
62. 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2004).
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Establishment Clause. 63 In both cases, the court identified two critical fac-
tors in its endorsement test analysis.64 First, the test focuses not on the
state's purpose for a contested display, but rather on the effect the display
has on the reasonable observer. 6 5 Second, the reasonable observer under-
stands the full context and history of a challenged display and therefore
has a higher degree of knowledge about the display's circumstances than
the average person.66 Applying these factors, the Third Circuit concluded
in both cases that, given the historic nature of the Ten Commandment
plaques, the reasonable observer would not view them as government en-
dorsements of religion.6 7
C. Where Does Football Fit In? The Supreme Court's Application of the
Endorsement Test in Santa Fe
Typically the endorsement test is applied in cases involving religious
displays like cr&hes, menorahs, and Ten Commandments plaques, yet the
Supreme Court used Justice O'Connor's test in Santa Fe Independent School
63. See Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 399; (discussing issue of case); Freethought Soc'y,
334 F.3d at 250 (same). In Freethought Society, Sally Flynn, member of the
Freethought Society of Greater Philadelphia, sued Chester County, alleging that a
bronze plaque of the Ten Commandments that was affixed to the Chester County
courthouse in 1920 violated the Establishment Clause. See Freethought Soc'y, 334
F.3d at 249-50 (recounting facts of case). Similarly, in Modrovich, two avowed athe-
ists challenged the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments plaque that was
donated to Allegheny County in 1918. See Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 399 (providing
background to litigation).
64. See id. at 402 (identifying two "critical" factors relevant to endorsement
test analysis); Freethought Socy, 334 F.3d at 258-59 (reiterating "critical" factors).
65. See Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 401 ("Thus, in applying the endorsement test,
we do not examine the County's motivations in displaying the Plaque, but consider
the Plaque's effect on the reasonable observer, determining whether the reasona-
ble observer would perceive it as an endorsement of religion."); Freethought Soc'y,
334 F.3d at 261 ("Under the 'endorsement' approach, we do not consider the
County's purpose in determining whether a religious display has violated the Es-
tablishment Clause; instead, we focus on the effect of the display on the reasonable
observer, inquiring whether the reasonable observer would perceive it as an en-
dorsement of religion.").
66. See Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 259 ("This Court has adopted Justice
O'Connor's view that a reasonable observer must be presumed to have an under-
standing of the general history of the display and the community in which it is
displayed; the reasonable observer is more knowledgeable than the uninformed
passerby."); see also Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 407 (noting that reasonable observer
knows history of plaque, courthouse, and circumstances surrounding plaque's
donation).
67. See Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 265 ("The reasonable observer, knowing
the age of the Ten Commandments plaque, would regard the decision to leave it
in place as motivated, in significant part, by the desire to preserve a longstanding
plaque."); see also Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 399 (holding that because "the Ten Com-
mandments plaque ... has been a fixture on an historical courthouse since 1918,
is not highlighted or displayed prominently, and is one of several historical relics
displayed on the courthouse, Allegheny County's refusal to remove it does not
send a message of government endorsement of religion").
11
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District v. Doe68 to address the constitutionality of student-initiated and stu-
dent-led prayers over the loud speakers at high school football games. 69
The Santa Fe Independent School District had a tradition of having a "Stu-
dent Chaplain" perform prayers prior to the start of home football
games.70 A group of students and parents challenged this practice, alleg-
ing that the prayers violated the Establishment Clause. 71 While litigation
was pending, the school adopted a new "Prayer at Football Games" policy
that involved a two-step student voting process: one to determine whether
"invocations" should be made before the games, and another to select a
student to deliver the invocations. 72 Despite the school's effort to disen-
tangle itself from the pre-game prayer, the Supreme Court struck down
the new policy, finding that "an objective Santa Fe High School student
will unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped
with her school's seal of approval. '7 3 The Court paid particular attention
to the history surrounding the policy, refusing "to turn a blind eye to the
context in which [the] policy arose," and concluded that the "context
quells any doubt that this policy was implemented with the purpose of
endorsing school prayer." 74
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT, THE ENDORSEMENT TEST, AND PRAYER AT HIGH
SCHOOL FOOTBALL GAMES: BORDEN V. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF
EAST BRUNSWICK
The Third Circuit recently used the endorsement test to address an-
other public school prayer at a football game challenge in Borden v. School
District of East Brunswick.75 Here, the court clearly articulated how to apply
68. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
69. See id. at 301 (stating issue presented).
70. See id. at 294 (recounting use of prayer in Santa Fe).
71. See id. at 294-95 (discussing litigants bringing case).
72. See id. at 294-98 (describing historical context).
73. See id. at 308 (providing holding of case).
74. See id. at 315 (emphasizing importance of history to endorsement analy-
sis). ChiefJustice Rehnquist dissented in Santa Fe, claiming that the majority opin-
ion "bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life." See id. at 318
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion). One commentator has
opined that Santa Fe "seems broad enough to dispose of elected student prayer
leaders at athletic events, graduations, and any other official school event." See
Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAw. 25, 56
(2000) (discussing potential implications of Santa Fe). The attorney who argued
the case for Santa Fe, however, believes that the Supreme Court issued a narrow
holding and argues that "if a school district's policies and actions do not highlight
prayer as a governmentally favored practice, then voluntary student-led, student-
initiated prayer should be achievable and should be deemed as constitutionally
permissible and protected under Santa Fe and prior Supreme Court precedent."
See Kelly J. Coghlan, Those Dangerous Student Prayers, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 809, 837-38
(2001) (predicting future interpretations of Santa Fe).
75. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (2009).
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the endorsement test in such cases. 76 Furthermore, the court offered im-
portant insights for Third Circuit practitioners in approaching Establish-
ment Clause cases involving prayer in public schools. 77
A. Factual Background
Marcus Borden, the head football coach and tenured Spanish teacher
at East Brunswick High School in New Jersey, led, organized, and partici-
pated in two prayer traditions with his team from 1983 until 2005.78 Bor-
den prayed with his players before team pasta dinners in the school
cafeteria ("pre-dinner prayer") and also before kickoff in the locker room
("pre-game prayer"). 79 A local minister, Reverend Smith, had led or writ-
ten the pre-dinner prayers prior to Borden's arrival at East Brunswick, and
the Reverend continued to lead or write the pre-dinner prayers until his
retirement in 2003.80 In 2003, Borden led the pre-dinner prayer for the
first game of the season, but then chose a senior player to conduct the
prayer for each remaining game.81 Borden continued this tradition dur-
ing the 2004 and 2005 seasons and requested that everyone stand during
the pre-dinner prayer.8 2 For the twenty-three football seasons after he was
first named head coach in 1983, Borden also led the pre-game prayer. 83
76. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's preferred application of the en-
dorsement test, see infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of important insights from Borden, see infra notes 150-56
and accompanying text.
78. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 159 (describing Borden's affiliation with East
Brunswick High School and involvement with team prayer).
79. See id. (explaining team prayer tradition). The team pasta dinners took
place at approximately 3:00 p.m. on game days in the high school cafeteria. See id.
(describing team dinners). Parents and cheerleaders were invited to eat with the
team. See id. (indicating individuals present at team dinners). The pre-game
prayer took place in the locker room immediately before each game started. See id.
(discussing pre-game prayer).
80. See id. (recounting Reverend Smith's participation in pre-meal prayers).
Reverend Smith personally led the pre-dinner prayer until 1997, when the athletic
director told him he could no longer do so. See id. (describing Reverend Smith's
leading of team prayers). From 1997 until his retirement in 2003, Reverend Smith
wrote prayers for the players to say. See id. (explaining Reverend Smith's contin-
ued involvement with team prayers even after athletic director restricted him from
leading them).
81. See id. (detailing Borden's integral involvement with team prayer).
82. See id. (explaining Borden's prayer tradition after Reverend Smith's
retirement).
83. See id. at 159-60 (describing Borden's tradition of leading prayer prior to
playing). For example, one locker room prayer was:
[D]ear lord, please guide us today in our quest in our game, our champi-
onship. Give us the courage and determination that we would need to
come out successful. Please let us represent our families and our commu-
nity well. Lastly, please guide our players and opponents so that they can
come out of this game unscathed, [and] no one is hurt.
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jo Ann Magistro, Superintendant of the East Brunswick School Dis-
trict ("School District"), ended that tradition in 2005 when she adopted a
policy prohibiting teacher or coach involvement in student prayers.8 4
This policy was a response to complaints Magistro received in September
2005 from parents of players regarding the pre-dinner prayers.8 5 Fearing
a potential lawsuit, Magistro met with the School District's counsel, Martin
Pachman, to discuss the legal implications of Borden's actions. 86
Pachman offered guidelines stating that school representatives could
neither "participate in," nor "encourage, lead, initiate, mandate, or other-
wise coerce, directly or indirectly, student prayer at any time in any school-
sponsored setting."8 7 Magistro and the East Brunswick Board of Educa-
84. See id. at 160-62 (recounting Superintendant Magistro's actions to pro-
hibit Borden from praying with team).
85. See id. (summarizing complaints Magistro received concerning Borden's
participation in team prayers). Several parents complained to Magistro, telling her
that Borden's inappropriate actions made their children uncomfortable. See id.
(describing parents' concerns about Borden's involvement in team prayers).
86. See id. (detailing actions Magistro took in response to complaints).
87. See id. at 160-61 (describing school guidelines concerning prayer). Specif-
ically, the guidelines stated:
1. Students have a constitutional right to engage in prayer on school
property, at school events, and even during the course of the school day,
provided that:
A. The activity is truly student initiated; and
B. The prayer activity does not interfere with the normal operations of
the school district. This would mean that, for example, if a student or a
group of students wish to engage in a prayer before or after their meal in
the cafeteria during their lunch period they would have a right to do so,
provided that the activity in which they are engaged does not disrupt the
normal operation and decorum of the other students eating in the cafete-
ria. Also, if student athletes on their own decide to hold a prayer huddle
before a game, after a game, or during half-time, they have a right to do
SO.
2. Neither the school district nor any representative of the school district
(teacher, coach, administrator, board member, etc.) may constitutionally
encourage, lead, initiate, mandate, or otherwise coerce, directly or indirectly, stu-
dent prayer at any time in any school-sponsored setting, including classes,
practices, pep rallies, team meetings, or athletic events.
3. Representatives of the school district, as referenced above, cannot par-
ticipate in student-initiated prayer. That very issue was decided by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in a decision cited with approval by the
United States Supreme Court and is, therefore, the operative law of the
land at this time. To quote the Court, "if while acting in their official
capacities (school district) employees join hands in a prayer circle or oth-
erwise manifest approval and solidarity with student religious exercises,
they cross the line between respect for religion and endorsement of relig-
ion," and such conduct was prohibited.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit case the guidelines referred to is Doe v. Duncanville Indepen-
dent School District, 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995). In Duncanville, the Fifth Circuit
held that a middle school basketball coach's tradition of saying the Lord's Prayer
with his team during practice, before and after games, and on the bus rides to and
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tion ("Board") subsequently adopted the guidelines as official school pol-
icy and instructed Borden that they expected his compliance with the new
rules.88
On November 21, 2005, Borden filed a lawsuit against the School Dis-
trict, the Board, and Magistro in the Superior Court of NewJersey, seeking
a declaratory judgment that the guidelines were unconstitutional and re-
questing preliminary and permanent injunctions that would prevent the
defendants from enforcing them.89 Borden claimed that unlike his previ-
ous practice of leading or encouraging team prayers, he now intended "to
show his respect for his players, respect for The Team Prayers, and respect
for East Brunswick's football tradition by engaging in two silent acts dur-
ing The Team Prayers: (i) bowing his head during grace; and (ii) taking a
knee with his team in the locker room."90 The new policies, he argued,
prohibited him from performing these acts.9 1 The defendants removed
the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
and then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the recent
guidelines were necessary because Borden's involvement with the team's
prayers violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 92
B. Borden Wins in District Court but Loses on Appeal to the Third Circuit
On July 25, 2006, Judge Cavanaugh of the District Court of NewJersey
heard oral arguments and entered a bench decision in favor of Borden.93
He stated: "an Establishment Clause violation would occur if the coach
initiated and led the activity, but I find nothing wrong with remaining
silent and bowing one's head and taking a knee as a sign of respect for his
players' actions and traditions, nor do I believe would a reasonable ob-
server."94 Specifically, the district court held that the School District's pol-
from games violated the Establishment Clause. See id. at 404 (stating facts and
holding of case).
88. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 160-61 (describing school's adoption of guide-
lines). Magistro claimed that she instituted the policy "to protect children who
could not protest pressure to participate in religious activities at school events" but
stressed that the School District still permits voluntary student prayer. See Boston,
supra note 6 (discussing superintendant's reasoning for policy).
89. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 162-63 (summarizing Borden's complaint).
90. See id. (outlining Borden's alleged change in participation with team
prayer).
91. See id. (referencing arguments in Borden's complaint).
92. See id. (describing procedural history of case).
93. See id. at 164 (detailing district court's order).
94. Id. In addition, Judge Cavanaugh stated:
I find that the Plaintiffs request to bow his head in silence and take a
knee do not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. I find,
further, that the Defendants' directive regarding the Plaintiff's nonpar-
ticipation is over broad and vague, and violates the Plaintiff's First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, freedom of association, ac-
ademic freedom, as well as New Jersey's constitutional rights to liberty
and free speech.
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icy was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to Borden, and
that Borden's silent actions of bowing his head at the pre-dinner prayer
and taking a knee at the pre-game prayer did not violate the Establishment
Clause.95
After his victory at the district court level, Borden began a new prayer
policy.96 Prior to the 2006 season, he gave his players the choice of
whether to pray before games, and the team voted to continue both prayer
traditions.9 7 Rather than leading the prayers, Borden only bowed his
head during the pre-dinner prayer and remained on one knee during the
pre-game locker room prayer.98 This new policy ended, however, when
the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision and found the
School Board's policy to be constitutionally permissible on its face and as
applied to Borden. 99 The Third Circuit further held that in addition to
Borden's prior actions of leading prayer, the proposed silent actions of
bowing his head and taking a knee also violated the Establishment
Clause. l 00
C. The Third Circuit Applies the Endorsement Test
After determining that the School Board's policy was acceptable be-
cause it was not facially unconstitutional and did not violate Borden's con-
stitutional rights, the Third Circuit turned to the issue of whether the
team prayer violated the Establishment Clause.' 0' The court first had to
choose which of the three Establishment Clause tests it would apply to
95. See id. at 165 (summarizing district court's order). The policy was deemed
unconstitutional on its face because it was overly broad and vague, and was uncon-
stitutional as applied to Borden because it violated his rights to freedom of speech,
academic freedom, freedom of association, and due process. See id. (detailing dis-
trict court's order). For a more in-depth discussion of the district court's opinion,
see Eric M. Helman, Comment, Borden v. East Brunswick School District: Clarify-
ing First Amendment Jurisprudence in the Public School Context, 42 NEW ENG. L. REv.
363, 363 (2008) (analyzing Borden and requesting that Supreme Court create
clearer test for prayer in public school cases).
96. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 162 (describing Borden's response to district
court's grant of summary judgment).
97. See id. (explaining Borden's actions prior to 2006 season). Borden sent an
email to the team co-captains asking them to survey the entire team about whether
they wanted to continue the prayer traditions. See id. (describing Borden's email
to co-captains). In the email, Borden indicated that "[w] hatever the players decide
to do is fine with me." Id.
98. See id. (discussing Borden's new approach to team prayer).
99. See id. at 179 (reversing district court's order). The court also held that
the School District had a right to adopt the guidelines. See id. at 174 ("The School
District has a legitimate educational interest in avoiding Establishment Clause vio-
lations, and the guidelines are reasonably related to that interest." (citing Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 730 n.2 (2004) (ScaliaJ., dissenting); Capitol Square Review
& Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1995))).
100. See id. at 175-76 (discussing constitutionality of Borden's past involve-
ment with team prayers as well as proposed silent actions).
101. See id. at 174 (stating that "the School District's guidelines and the
Board's statement were not unconstitutional on their face and did not violate Bor-
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address Borden's actions.1 0 2 Citing Santa Fe, the court held that the en-
dorsement test applies "[i]n cases involving state participation in a relig-
ious activity." 0 3  Accordingly, the court found the endorsement test
applicable to Borden, "a state employee engaging in the religious activity
of students in some fashion."10 4 Although the Third Circuit has applied
the other two tests in Establishment Clause cases, here, the court restricted
its analysis to only the endorsement test.
10 5
Consistent with its application of the endorsement test in Modrovich,
the Third Circuit inquired "whether a reasonable observer familiar with
the history and context of the display would perceive the display as a gov-
ernment endorsement of religion."1 0 6 In addition, the court stressed that
the test does not consider the government's subjective purpose for its ac-
tions, but rather "focuses on the perceptions of the reasonable ob-
server." 10 7  Under this standard, the court held that Borden's past
den's constitutional rights," and considering whether School District properly
adopted guidelines out of concern for Establishment Clause violations).
102. See id. at 175 (choosing proper test out of Lemon, coercion, and endorse-
ment tests).
103. See id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308
(2000)) (discussing proper test for analyzing Borden's actions).
104. See id. (justifying use of endorsement test).
105. See id. ("We do not address whether Borden's conduct violates the Estab-
lishment Clause under the coercion and Lemon tests because we find that Borden's
behavior violates the Establishment Clause under the endorsement test.") (cita-
tions omitted). Although Judge Fisher's lead opinion analyzed Borden's actions
under just the endorsement test, Judge McKee did note in a concurring opinion
that Borden's actions raised a "serious Establishment Clause issue" under the coer-
cion test and compared Borden's facts to the facts of Lee v. Weisman. See id. at 181-
83 (McKee, J., concurring) (analyzing Borden's actions under coercion test). The
Borden court's use of just one test differs from the Third Circuit's analysis in other
cases involving Establishment Clause violations. See, e.g., Modrovich v. Allegheny
County, 385 F.3d 397, 406 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that "although we find the
endorsement test to be the appropriate standard by which to scrutinize the Plaque,
we will apply both the endorsement and Lemon test in case a higher court prefers
to apply the traditional Lemon test"); Freethought Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester
County, 334 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that Lemon analysis is appro-
priate in addition to endorsement test analysis "in view of the possibility that a
higher court may prefer to analyze the constitutionality of this plaque under the
traditional Lemon purpose and effect inquiry" and because of "the fact that other
Courts of Appeals presented with similar issues have applied the Lemon test"). In
addition, the Third Circuit analyzed an alleged Establishment Clause violation
under the coercion, Lemon, and endorsement tests in ACLU of New Jersey v. Black
Horse Pike Regional Board of Education. See 84 F.3d 1471, 1478-83 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (analyzing facts under coercion test); see also id. at 1483-88 (analyzing facts
under Lemon test); id. at 1485-88 (analyzing facts under endorsement test).
106. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 175 (quoting Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 401); see also
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (adopting endorsement
test); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 174 (3d Cir.
2002) (applying endorsement test).
107. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 175 (quoting Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 401) (explain-
ing reasonable observer standard in endorsement test). In addition, the endorse-
ment test does not consider the subjective feelings of those who have been
"offended" by a particular action or display. See Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 407 n.2
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involvement with team prayer-"as a participant, an organizer, and a
leader-would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that he was endors-
ing religion."1 0 8 The more difficult question remained: whether Borden's
proposed actions of bowing his head and taking a knee also violated the
Establishment Clause.
10 9
The Third Circuit, relying heavily on Santa Fe, concluded that Bor-
den's proposed actions were unconstitutional.1 10 In Santa Fe, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the Santa Fe Independent School District's
"Prayer at Football Games" policy failed the endorsement test because,
based on the school's history of prayers at games, the reasonable observer
would view the new policy as an attempt to continue an unconstitutional
practice of state-sponsored prayer."' The Santa Fe Court further rea-
soned that the school district's stated intention to "solemnize sporting
events, promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and establish an
appropriate environment for competition" was insufficient to make the
policy acceptable. 112 The Third Circuit followed a similar approach in
Borden, finding that a reasonable observer would have knowledge of Bor-
den's "extensive involvement" with the team prayers."t 3 Based on that
knowledge, the reasonable observer would view his proposed actions as an
endorsement of religion. 114 The court also stated that Borden's pur-
(explaining proper understanding of reasonable observer); see also Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("[Wle do not ask whether there is any person who could find an endorse-
ment of religion, whether some people may be offended by the display, or whether
some reasonable person might think [the State] endorses religion." (quoting Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538,
1544 (6th Cir. 1992))).
108. Borden, 523 F.3d at 176 (concluding that Borden's participation in team
prayer was unconstitutional). The court cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in Doe v.
Duncanville Independent School District, a factually similar case involving a middle
school basketball coach who recited the Lord's Prayer with his team during prac-
tices, games, and bus rides to and from games. See id. (comparing facts to Dun-
canville); see also Doe v. Duncanville Ind. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995)
(recounting coach's involvement with prayer). The Fifth Circuit found that the
coach's participation in prayers during "school-controlled" activities "signals an un-
constitutional endorsement of religion." See Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 406 (finding
coach's participation in prayer unconstitutional).
109. See Borden, 524 F.3d at 175-79 (considering constitutionality of Borden's
past involvement with team prayer and proposed actions).
110. See id. at 176-79 (analyzing Borden's actions under Santa Fe).
111. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (applying
endorsement test to Santa Fe Independent School District's modified prayer
policy).
112. See id. at 306-09 (rejecting school district's argument that revised prayer
policy was not intended to endorse religion).
113. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 178 (clarifying what reasonable observer would
know about Borden's past actions).
114. See id. at 177-78 (comparing Coach Borden's proposed actions to Santa
Fe Independent School District's revised prayer policy and discussing knowledge
of reasonable observer).
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ported purposes of showing respect for his team and demonstrating soli-
darity would have no impact on the reasonable observer's perception.1 1 5
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF BORDEN IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION
OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST
The Borden opinion offers important insights to practitioners dealing
with Establishment Clause cases in the Third Circuit.1 6 First, the opinion
clearly predicates the Third Circuit's preferred method of applying the
endorsement test.117 In addition, Borden shows the importance of evaluat-
ing the historical context of alleged Establishment Clause violations under
the endorsement test.118 Such historical context creates difficulty for
school representatives attempting to change an unconstitutional prayer
policy into one that passes the endorsement test.119 Finally, Borden
presents practitioners with a very narrow holding, leaving open certain sit-
uations in which coaches may still be constitutionally permitted to bow
their heads or take a knee while their teams pray.120
A. The Third Circuit's Endorsement Standard
In Borden, the Third Circuit articulated the preferred approach in its
application of the endorsement test.121 The proper question is "whether a
reasonable observer familiar with the history and context of [a chal-
lenged] display would perceive the display as a government endorsement
115. See id. (rejecting Borden's argument that his actions were permissible
because he had no intention of endorsing religion). Borden argued that his inten-
tion behind the prayer was to create team unity. See Finley, supra note 3 (quoting
Borden as saying, "[t]o win championships takes a special team, players who join
together and play as one. The prayers are a small portion of the whole total prepa-
ration of a football team. There are many things we as do as coaches do to get our
kids to bind and believe in each other.").
116. For a discussion of the insights about Third Circuit Establishment Clause
jurisprudence gleaned from Borden, see infra notes 121-56 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's preferred endorsement test appli-
cation, see infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
118. For a discussion of the importance of historical context in the endorse-
ment test, see infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
119. For a discussion of the difficulty of curing an unconstitutional prayer
policy, see infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion examining Borden's narrow holding, see infra notes 143-
49 and accompanying text.
121. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 175 (3d Cir. 2008)
(explaining endorsement test), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (2009). Unfortunately,
the Third Circuit did not indicate why the Lemon or coercion tests were not appli-
cable; instead, the court merely declined to consider either of the other tests be-
cause Borden's actions violated the Establishment Clause under the endorsement
test. See id. (explaining reasons for using endorsement test). For examples of the
Third Circuit using multiple tests to analyze alleged Establishment Clause viola-
tions, see supra note 105.
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of religion."' 22 Additionally, the Third Circuit has consistently empha-
sized two elements of the test.1 23 First, the inquiry focuses on the percep-
tions of the reasonable observer, not on the government's subjective
purpose for a challenged display. 124 Second, the reasonable observer is
deemed to have a heightened knowledge of the historical context of a
contested display.
125
B. The Importance of Historical Context
Given the heightened knowledge of the reasonable observer, the his-
torical context of a government practice is a key factor of the endorsement
test and has had a major impact on the outcome of several Third Circuit
Establishment Clause cases, including Borden.126 In both Freethought Society
and Modrovich, for example, the court held that the "age and history alone
122. Id. (citing Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 401 (3d Cir.
2004)) (articulating relevant question under endorsement test).
123. For a discussion of the two elements the Third Circuit focuses on, see
infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
124. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 175 (describing proper application of endorse-
ment test); Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 401 (explaining that Third Circuit does not con-
sider governmental motivation when applying endorsement test); Freethought
Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that Third Circuit does not consider government's purpose when determining
whether challenged religious display violates Establishment Clause). For further
discussion of the Third Circuit's holdings in both Modrovich and Freethought Society,
see supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
125. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 178 ("A reasonable observer would have knowl-
edge of Borden's extensive involvement with the team's prayers over the past
twenty-three years during which he organized, participated in, and led prayer.");
Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 407 (explaining that "the reasonable observer is deemed to
know the history of the Allegheny Plaque, the general history of Allegheny County,
and the fact that the Plaque has been affixed to the courthouse for many years");
Freethought Socy, 334 F.3d at 259 (holding that "a reasonable observer must be pre-
sumed to have an understanding of the general history of the display and the com-
munity in which it is displayed; the reasonable observer is more knowledgeable
than the uninformed passerby"); ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 103, 107
(3d Cir. 1999) (adopting Justice O'Connor's view that "the reasonable observer in
the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the
community and forum in which the religious display appears" and "the knowledge
attributed to the reasonable observer [cannot] be limited to the information
gleaned simply from viewing the challenged display"); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse
Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1486 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (stressing that
reasonable observer is aware of "history and ubiquity" of challenged practice").
One commentator has criticized the Third Circuit's application of the reason-
able observer standard in endorsement test analysis, claiming that the reasonable
person's "heightened knowledge requirement ... is not a fair and accurate repre-
sentation of the regular citizen." See Kirsten K. Wendela, Note, Context is in the Eye
of the Beholder: Establishment Clause Violations and the More-Than-Reasonable Person, 80
CHI.-KErNr L. REv. 981, 1000 (2005) (critiquing Third Circuit's application of rea-
sonable person standard in Freethought Society).
126. For discussion of how the heightened knowledge of a reasonable ob-
server has impacted the application of the endorsement test in the Third Circuit,
see infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
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[of the challenged Ten Commandment displays] provided sufficient con-
text to prevent the reasonable observer from viewing an otherwise relig-
ious plaque as an endorsement of religion." 12 7 Thus, in both cases, a Ten
Commandments plaque affixed to a county courthouse did not violate the
Establishment Clause because of the historical significance of the
plaque. 1
2 8
Further, in Black Horse Pike the Third Circuit again emphasized the
importance of the history and context associated with a challenged prac-
tice.' 29 At issue was whether a school policy allowing students to vote on
whether to have prayer at their graduation violated the Establishment
Clause.13 0 The Third Circuit concluded that, given the school's "long-
standing tradition" of including prayer at its graduation ceremonies, a rea-
sonable observer would view the policy as an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion.
13
'
Similarly, the historical knowledge of the reasonable person also
proved to be the deciding factor in Borden.1 32 Under the endorsement
test, the court could not evaluate Coach Borden's proposed actions inde-
127. See Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 410 (explaining impact of age and history of
challenged plaque on reasonable observer). In Freethought Society, the Third Circuit
held that the reasonable observer would know that the Ten Commandments
plaque had been affixed to the courthouse since 1920 and "would regard the deci-
sion to leave it in place as motivated, in significant part, by the desire to preserve a
longstanding plaque." See Freethought Soc', 334 F.3d at 265 (discussing effect of
history of Ten Commandments plaque on reasonable observer).
128. See Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 414 (stating holding of case); Freethought Socy,
334 F.3d at 265 (finding that governmental refusal to remove plaque does not
violate endorsement test). Just one year after Modrovich was decided, the Supreme
Court decided two Ten Commandments display cases. See McCreary County v.
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (finding Ten Commandments display on Ken-
tucky courthouse violated Establishment Clause); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005) (upholding Ten Commandments display on Texas courthouse).
129. See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1486-87 (stressing importance of evaluat-
ing prayer policy "under the totality of the circumstances"). To explain the impor-
tance of context, the court described the differing outcomes of Lynch v. Donnelly
and County of Allegheny v. ACLU. See id. (comparing Supreme Court holdings). In
Lynch, the Court held that a creche display, set up during the Christmas season
alongside a Santa Claus house, reindeer, Christmas tree, clown, elephant, and
teddy bear, did not violate the Establishment Clause because of its context. See id.
(citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671, 680 (1984)). In Allegheny, however,
the Court found that a creche displayed alone, on the main entrance of the Alle-
gheny Courthouse did violate the Establishment Clause. See id. (citing County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 580-81, 599-600 (1989)).
130. See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1474 (presenting issue of whether voting
policy violated Establishment Clause).
131. See id. at 1487 (explaining how history of prayer affects perception of
reasonable observer).
132. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 178 (3d Cir. 2008)
(finding that based on Borden's history of involvement with team prayer, reasona-
ble observer would conclude that Borden's silent acts of bowing his head during
team's pre-meal grace and taking a knee during locker-room prayer endorsed re-
ligion), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (2009).
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pendently from his history of involvement with team prayers. 13 3 Based on
his history of organizing, leading, and participating in team prayer, the
reasonable observer would not conclude that Borden would be merely
showing respect for his team when silently bowing his head and taking a
knee; rather, the court found that under the circumstances, the reasona-
ble observer would find these actions to be endorsing religion.' 3 4
C. The State Cannot Modify an Unconstitutional Prayer Policy Under Borden's
Endorsement Test
The endorsement test's emphasis on historical context causes diffi-
culty when a school representative attempts to transform an unconstitu-
tional prayer policy into a constitutionally acceptable practice. 135 In Santa
Fe, Black Horse Pike, and Borden, for example, a school representative at-
tempted to revise an impermissible prayer policy to comport with the Es-
tablishment Clause, but the new policy failed the endorsement test
133. See id. at 176 (asserting that "we must consider all of his prior prayer
activities with his team as the Supreme Court did in Santa Fe').
134. See id. at 178 (describing effect of history on reasonable observer).
135. For a discussion of the difficulty in changing an unconstitutional prayer
policy into a constitutionally permissible one, see infra notes 135-42 and accompa-
nying text. But see ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (find-
ing that "modified" Christmas display created by city after having its original
crche and menorah display enjoined was permissible under endorsement test).
In Schundler, a federal district court enjoined a New Jersey town from continuing
its thirty-year holiday tradition of displaying a cr&he and a menorah in front of
the town's city hall. See id. at 95 (discussing procedural history of case). While the
appeal to the Third Circuit was pending, the town erected a "modified display"
containing a cr&he, a menorah, a Christmas tree, Santa Claus, Frosty the Snow-
man, a red sled, and Kwanza symbols. See id. at 96 (describing modified holiday
display). The Third Circuit found that the modified display endorsed Christianity
and Judaism and remanded the case to the district court, which held the modified
display to be unconstitutional. See id. at 96-97 (recounting procedural history).
The town appealed the district court ruling, and the Third Circuit reversed, find-
ing the modified display to be constitutional. See id. at 95 (finding cr&he passed
constitutional scrutiny). Comparing the modified display to the permissible holi-
day displays in Lynch and Allegheny, then-Third Circuit Justice Samuel Alito found
the modified Christmas display permissible under the endorsement test. See id. at
104-07 (finding modified display constitutionally permissible under Lynch and Alle-
gheny). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings in Lynch and Allegheny,
see supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Borden, it would be interest-
ing to see howJustice Alito would react to Coach Borden's "modified" prayer pol-
icy. See Shannon P. Dully, 3rd Circuit: Coach's Moment of Silence Constitutes
Endorsement of Religion, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.law.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=900005561401 (discussing Borden's appeal to Supreme Court).
For a discussion of how Justice Alito may impact the Supreme Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence, see Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5
FiRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 1, 1 (2006) (arguing that in light of additions of Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Alito to the United States Supreme Court, "[w]e
may be on the cusp of a root-and-branch change in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, which will fundamentally alter the landscape of church/state relations").
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because the previous violation had tainted it.1 3 6 In Santa Fe, the school
district's "Prayer at Football Games" policy-which allowed students to de-
cide whether there would be prayer at football games-failed the endorse-
ment test because the reasonable observer would view the new policy as a
continuation of the previous unconstitutional "Student Chaplain" prayer
policy. 137 In Black Horse Pike, the school district attempted to revise an
unconstitutional policy of including prayers at graduation ceremonies by
allowing students to decide whether to include prayer. 13 8 The Third Cir-
cuit struck down the school district's attempt to remedy the Establishment
Clause violation, finding that a reasonable observer would view the new
policy as an attempt to perpetuate its "longstanding tradition" of unconsti-
tutional prayers at graduation.
1 39
Similarly, in Borden, the Third Circuit again struck down an attempt to
correct an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. 140 Like the policies
in Santa Fe and Black Horse Pike, Borden involved a longstanding unconstitu-
tional prayer policy causing a reasonable viewer to find any subsequent
policy to be a continuance of the prior policy. 4 1 Thus, despite the
coach's effort to adopt a prayer policy comporting with the Establishment
Clause, his past violations prohibited him from doing so.
142
D. Borden: A Very Narrow Opinion
Because the team's history of prayer was the deciding factor in the
court's opinion, Borden leaves Third Circuit practitioners with a very nar-
row holding to follow. 143 The lead opinion by Judge Fisher, along with
136. For a discussion of how the historical context of a challenged prayer
policy affected the outcomes of Santa Fe, Black Horse Pike, and Borden, see infra
notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
137. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (describ-
ing evolution of prayer policy from "Student Chaplain" to "Prayer at Football
Games").
138. See ACLU of N.J. v. BLACK HORSE PIKE REG'L BD. OF EDUC., 84 F.3D 1471,
1474-75 (3D CIR. 1996) (EN BANC) (discussing school board's desire to change its
prayer policy in light of Lee v. Weisman); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592
(1992) (invalidating public school's practice of including prayer in graduation
ceremonies).
139. See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1487 (concluding that new policy fails
endorsement test).
140. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 179 (3d Cir. 2008)
(finding that even under Borden's proposed policy, reasonable observer would
view his actions as endorsing religion), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (2009)..
141. See id. at 178-79 (finding that absent twenty-three year history of involve-
ment with prayer, reasonable observer might reach different conclusion).
142. See id. at 178 (stressing importance of prior actions).
143. See id. ("We find that, based on the history of Borden's conduct with the team's
prayers, his acts cross the line and constitute an unconstitutional endorsement of
religion.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 187 (BarryJ., concurring) ("Apparently,
it is only Borden, given his prior history, who cannot constitutionally respond to
constitutionally protected student-initiated and student-composed prayer ... )
(emphasis added).
2009]
23
Liva: Even Silence Has No Prayer: The Third Circuit Sacks Coach's Silen
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the concurring opinion by Judge Barry, suggested that absent Borden's
history of participation in team prayer, the result "would likely" have been
different. 144 In the lead opinion,Judge Fisher acknowledged that bowing
one's head and taking a knee could, as Borden argued, be viewed as signs
of respect. 14 5 The court went on to clarify that if a coach "who had never
engaged in prayer with his team were to bow his head and take a knee
while his team engaged in a moment of reflection or prayer, [it] would
likely reach a different conclusion because the same history and context of
endorsing religion would not be present."146 In her concurring opinion,
Judge Barry agreed that she would likely find "no endorsement of religion"
absent a history of involvement with team prayer.14 7 Because this decision
hinges specifically on a history of involvement with team prayer, the
court's opinion is narrow and still leaves open the possibility of a coach
permissibly bowing his head and taking a knee in silence while his team
engages in student-initiated and student-led prayers. 148 The key differ-
ence is that the coach cannot have previously participated in, led, or or-
ganized any instances of prayer.149
144. See id. at 178-79 (majority opinion) (describing potential alternate out-
come absent history of prayer with team and stating that "[w]ithout Borden's
twenty-three years of organizing, participating in, and leading prayer with his team,
this conclusion would not be so clear as it presently is"); see also id. at 187 (Barry, J.,
concurring) (stating that, like Judge Fisher, she would likely find "no endorsement
of religion were a football coach, who had never engaged in prayer with his team,
to bow his head or take a knee while his team engaged in a moment of reflection
or prayer"); Decision of the Day, http://www.uslaw.com/library/Federal-judici-
ary/WatchBowPolice.php?item=1 10515 (Apr. 15, 2008) ("Indeed, Judges Fisher
and Barry believe that most high school coaches could kneel down with their team
without violating the Establishment Clause, just not Coach Borden, given his long
history of encouraging and leading team prayer .... ).
Judge McKee, who also wrote a concurring opinion, disagreed that there
would be a different result absent Borden's twenty-three year history of prayer with
the team. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 179 (McKee, J., concurring) (concluding that
Borden's proposed actions "might well violate the Establishment Clause even ab-
sent his 23-year history"). Although acknowledging that it would be a more diffi-
cult case, Judge McKee believed that a reasonable observer would still view the
coach's actions as an impermissible endorsement of religion. See id. at 180 (dis-
cussing why absence of history of prayer would not change outcome of case).
145. See id. at 178 (majority opinion) (commenting on alternate scenario).
146. Id. at 178-79 (concluding that if Borden had not prayed with team
before, outcome of case would likely have been different).
147. See id. at 187 (Barry, J., concurring) (agreeing with lead opinion that case
would be closer if Borden had not prayed with team in past).
148. See id. at 179 (majority opinion) (concluding that coaches without histo-
ries of prayer with their teams may silently bow their heads or take knee while their
team prays).
149. Cf id. ("[I]n Borden's case, the conclusion we reach today is clear be-
cause he organized, participated in, and led prayer activities with his team on nu-
merous occasions for twenty-three years.").
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E. Advice to Practitioners
The decision in Borden provides important insights for practitioners
litigating school prayer cases in the Third Circuit.1 5 0 First, the Third Cir-
cuit clearly stated its preferred application of Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test-an approach that stresses the history of a challenged practice
and considers only the perception of the reasonable observer.15 1 Practi-
tioners attempting to uphold a prayer policy should show that the coach
had minimal historical participation in team prayer, while those trying to
strike down a prayer policy should point to prior instances where the
school official had any kind of contribution to the prayer.1 52 Practitioners
should also be prepared to make their arguments under both the Lemon
and coercion tests because although the Borden court applied just the en-
dorsement test, the Third Circuit has applied the other tests in similar
circumstances. 
1 53
The Third Circuit additionally confirmed that a school district has a
legitimate interest in avoiding Establishment Clause violations, and thus, is
constitutionally permitted to implement policies prohibiting teacher or
coach involvement with student prayer. 5 4 A practitioner will face diffi-
culty convincing the court that the policy is constitutionally permissible if
the coach led, organized, or participated in student prayer.1 55 If the
coach remained silent while bowing a head or taking a knee, however, a
practitioner could possibly convince the Third Circuit that the policy does
not violate the Establishment Clause as long as the coach lacked history of
involvement in the prayer.1 5 6
V. CONCLUSION
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Third Circuit's
opinion, officials or coaches like Marcus Borden will likely be prohibited
from having any involvement with a team's pre-dinner and pre-game
prayers. 157 The Third Circuit's use of the endorsement test creates a strict
150. For further discussion providing insights to Third Circuit practitioners,
see infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
151. For an explanation of the Third Circuit's preferred application of the
endorsement test, see supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
152. For further discussion of the focus on historical practices, see supra notes
126-34 and accompanying text.
153. For examples of the Third Circuit using multiple Establishment Clause
tests in the same case, see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the School District's policy and its right to adopt that
policy, see supra notes 84-88, 99, and accompanying text.
155. For an analysis of why a coach may not pray with players, see supra note
108 and accompanying text.
156. For an explanation describing the narrowness of the Third Circuit's
opinion in Borden and how a coach may constitutionally bow his or her head or
take a knee, see supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
157. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (denying peti-
tion for certiorari); see also Duffy, supra note 135 (describing Borden's appeal to
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standard in its goal to limit government endorsement of religion.1 5 8 The
test's narrow margin focuses on the coaches' history of prayer, leaving lit-
dle room for coaches wishing to participate in any team prayer. 159
Coaches will therefore face a difficult challenge in convincing the Third
Circuit that their prayer policies-even silent ones-are constitutionally
permissible.'
60
Edward A. Liva
Supreme Court). Borden's attorney stated, "[f]ourjudges have looked at this case,
and we have four different opinions .... I believe this is an appropriate case for
the Supreme Court to review and end the confusion about the rights of coaches."
See Duffy, supra note 135 (reporting Borden's attorney's response to Third Circuit
decision). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Borden, see supra notes
101-15 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's use of the endorsement test, see
supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
159. For further discussion on the narrow focus on history of prayer, see supra
notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
160. For further discussion on the difficulty of prayer policies passing the
Third Circuit's standards, see supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
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